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ABSTRACT  
Ideomotor theory of human action control proposes that activation of a motor 
representation can occur either through internally intended or externally perceived 
actions. Critically, sometimes these two ways of eliciting a motor response may be 
conflicting, for example when intending one action and perceiving another, necessitating 
the recruitment of enhanced action control processes to avoid motor mimicry. Based on 
previous evidence, suggesting that reduced motor mimicry is associated with self-related 
processing, we aimed at enhancing these action control mechanisms during motor 
contagion experimentally by an induction of self-focus. In two within-subjects 
experiments, participants had to enforce their action intention against an external motor 
contagion tendency, either under heightened or normal self-focus. As predicted, self-
focus reduced motor mimicry under both induction methods. Our findings indicate that 
self-focus is able to enhance online action control mechanisms needed to resist 
unintentional motor contagion, thus enabling a modulation of automatic mirroring 
responses. 
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 According to the ideomotor account of action control, voluntary actions are 
controlled by their perceivable consequences (James, 1890), as performing of an action 
leads to an association between the action and its perceivable consequences through 
learning and thus form the basis for motor representations (Prinz, 1997). Motor 
representations are anticipations of the sensory feedback resulting of the action they 
represent, so that internally generated intentions (i.e. thinking of the desired sensory 
action-effects) can immediately be translated into the matching motor representation. 
However, because of this inherent property of motor representations, merely observing a 
movement automatically activates the corresponding motor plan. Hence, not only our 
own intentions, but also perceived actions have the power to induce a corresponding 
action representation and a strong imitative tendency for its execution in the observer 
(Greenwald, 1970, 1972). For example, people often unconsciously mimic facial 
expressions (Dimberg et al., 2000) and bodily movements of interaction partners 
(‘chameleon effect’, Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Similarly, neuroscientific evidence has 
shown that observing an action activates the same set of ‘mirror’ regions involved in the 
execution of this particular movement in both macaque monkeys (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004) and humans (Buccino et al., 2001), and can elicit higher motor-evoked potentials 
from the muscle responsible for the observed movement (Fadiga et al., 2005; Strafella & 
Paus, 2001).  
Nevertheless, automatic mimicry of observed behaviour is not the default 
behaviour in our day-to-day behaviour, but overt imitation rather depends on the current 
intentions and goals of the observer and the situational context. For example, seeing 
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someone smiling at me normally leads involuntary to the same response (Dimberg et al., 
2000), but for instance my knowledge of his intentions (e.g. being deceptive) or the 
circumstances (e.g. being at a funeral) might lead to the inhibition of the automatically 
activated motor representation of this behaviour. However, motor contagion is usually 
compelling and involuntary, so that sometimes we might have problems to resist, in this 
case smiling at a funeral, such automatically induced motor mimicry by perception. 
Hence paradoxically, the side-effect of ideomotor action control, namely automatic 
activation of the corresponding motor representation and induction of motor mimicry via 
action perception, can hamper the concurrent planning and execution of one’s own 
voluntary, goal-directed actions. For example, in the ‘imitation-inhibition task’ (Fig. 1A), 
perceiving a movement on a computer monitor, while performing another, opposite 
movement, led to an interference effect, namely slower reaction times on such 
incongruent compared to congruent trials (i.e. perceiving the same movement) (Brass et 
al., 2000). Motoric conflicts between internally and externally induced action 
representations thus necessitate the involvement of increased action control mechanisms. 
Previous research has indicated that these action control mechanisms rely on key 
processes specifically dedicated to distinguish one’s own action from someone else’s 
action and to represent intentions of oneself and others’ (Brass & Spengler, 2008). A 
recent fMRI study showed that especially the latter functional processes seem to be of 
particular relevance in situations of motor conflict induced through motor contagion 
(Spengler et al., 2009). Highly consistent with other neuroimaging studies (Amodio & 
Frith, 2006; Northoff et al., 2006), these functions, such as mental state attribution and 
self-related processing, activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the same region 
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that also yielded a key activation in the imitation-inhibition task (Fig. 1B, Brass, Ruby & 
Spengler, 2009). Self-referential processing concerns stimuli that are experienced as 
strongly related to one’s own person (Kelley et al., 2002; Northoff et al., 2006) and are 
common to the distinct concepts of self in different domains, for example in 
autobiographical memory, self-description, self-evaluation or self-reflection (Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004). Similarly, the mPFC is thought to be involved during attribution of 
intentional mental states, including emotions, thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs, to both 
oneself and other persons (Frith & Frith, 2003; Gilbert et al., 2006; Fig. 1B). Most 
importantly, the fMRI study by Spengler et al., 2009 demonstrated, that a lower 
interference effect, meaning that participants managed to enforce their own intention 
more efficiently and thus exhibited less motor mimicry, was associated with higher 
activation in mPFC. This indicates that interindividual differences in the mechanisms of 
processing information about the self, led to a higher ability to execute their own motor 
intention under a condition of motor contagion. Accordingly the arising question is if not 
only stable interindividual differences, as in traits related to chronically heightened or 
lowered self-focus and self-reflection (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975), can enhance 
action control of motor contagion, but also if it is be possible to improve such action 
control processes by experimentally inducing changes in self-focus.  
Evidence from social psychology is consistent with the idea that self-focus can 
enhance short or long-term goals, intentions or norms (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). The 
theory of objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) has proposed that humans 
possess the unique capacity to become the object of one’s own attention. This internally 
directed self-awareness is assumed to activate inner standards and provoke a comparison 
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with the actual behaviour these standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 
2001), but also important goals and motivations and the current state or behavior should 
be more salient and accessible under self-focus (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990). 
Numerous experiments have shown that objective self-awareness can be induced by 
placing subjects in front of a mirror, camera or audience and by playing recordings of 
one’s own voice (Wicklund & Duval, 1981). For example, self-awareness induced by the 
‘mirror-manipulation’ reduces automatic behaviour (e.g. the effects of stereotypes) by 
rendering different action possibilities more salient (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 
2000). Self-focus can be directed to all self-aspects, including one’s current mental states 
(e.g., attitudes, intentions, emotions). Self-awareness also includes knowing that we are 
the same person across time, that we are the author of our thoughts and actions, and that 
we are distinct from the environment (Kircher & David, 2003). Ingram (1990) defined 
self-focus as "an awareness of self-referent, internally generated information that stands 
in contrast to an awareness of externally generated information derived through sensory 
receptors" (pg. 156). Although self-focus can generally activate all facets of one’s own 
self, it has been proposed that the dominant dimension of the current situation or context 
will automatically determine the transfer of the self-focus on this particular aspect (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972). Applied to situations of motoric conflict, self-awareness processes 
could be pivotal to reinforce current internally produced action intentions against 
distracting, externally triggered action representations and might therefore modulate the 
degree of displayed automatic motor mimicry.  
In line with this idea, two recent studies, one in a naturalistic and one in an 
experimental setting, have shown that social attitudes can modulate motor contagion 
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(Leighton et al., 2009; van Baaren et al., 2003). In these between-subject studies one 
group of participants were primed before the experiment in a sentence completion task, 
with either pro-social attitudes (e.g. words such as friend, cooperate, together), or with 
anti-social attitudes (e.g. independent, single, enemy). Both studies yielded more motor 
mimicry in the pro-social group compared to the anti-socially primed participants. One 
possible explanation of this effect might be that anti-social attitudes promote a higher 
degree of self-focus in the participants, as this condition probably is more self-related 
than the pro-social condition, which in contrast refers rather to shared experiences with 
other agents. Heightened self-awareness may enhance action control mechanisms by 
raising the focus on internally generated action representations and possible concurrent 
inhibition of externally induced action representations. 
Our study thus aimed to explicitly test this hypothesis with a more conclusive 
within-subject design, as so far, most relevant studies from social psychology on 
objective self-awareness have employed between-subject designs (). To carefully 
investigate the effect of self-focus on action control mechanisms during motor contagion, 
we used an established experimental paradigm, the above-mentioned imitation-inhibition 
task, which as been employed in several previous studies (Brass et al., 2000, 2005; 
Spengler & Brass, 2009). In this task participants have to perform either an index- or 
middle-finger lifting movement, while concurrently perceiving either congruent or 
incongruent finger movements (Fig.1A). The advantage of this paradigm lies in its 
heightened sensitivity to produce interference effects, as it is a choice reaction-time task, 
and that both inhibitory (i.e. the amount of inhibition of the contagious incongruent 
movement) and facilitatory effects (i.e. the degree of motor contagion from the congruent 
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condition) on motor mimicry can be differentiated. This is of particular relevance for the 
present study, as our hypothesis of enhanced action-control mechanisms under self-focus 
predicts, first, minimized motor mimicry, expressed in a reduced interference effect, 
under the self-focus condition, and, second, more specifically that the smaller 
interference effect should be caused by enhanced performance under motoric conflict, 
meaning shorter reaction times in incongruent trials rather then longer reaction times on 
congruent trials. To induce heightened self-focus, we used a well-established method of 
non-instructed mirror self-observation the first experiment, which has yielded effects of 
increased self-awareness in numerous experiments from social psychology (). 
Participants performed the imitation-inhibition task, either while concurrently seeing 
themselves in a mirror opposite to themselves (self-focus condition), or they instead 
performed the task in front of a black board (no self-focus condition). If self-awareness 
enhances action control mechanism, needed to resist motor mimicry, then a decreased 
interference effect, caused by increased inhibitory processes in incongruent trails, should 
be observed. The second experiment aimed at replicating the results of the first study, but 
this time with another, novel method of self-focus induction. In this experiment subjects 
again completed the imitation-inhibition task, but this time the self-focus was elicited by 
a self-referential task, namely judging evaluative statements (e.g. “Leipzig is a pleasant 
town.”) in the self-focus block. In the control condition the presented sentences rather 
necessitated retrieval from semantic memory (“Leipzig is the capital of Germany.”). In 
neuroimaging studies this self-referential task has reliably elicited activation of the mPFC 
(Zysset et al., 2002), the cortical area most commonly related to the processing of self-
relevant information (Northoff & Bermpohl 2004). The rationale for this procedure was 
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to test whether another class of self-referential stimuli, namely more abstract, 
lingualistically mediated self-knowledge, can enhance the same action control 
mechanisms resolving conflict of motor representations. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Participants 
Nineteen volunteers (female, mean age years, range ) participated in the 
experiment. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The experiment was undertaken with the understanding and written consent of 
each subject and in compliance with national legislation and the Code of Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects of the World Medical 
Association (Declaration of Helsinki). 
 
Procedure 
After arrival participant received a written instruction of the imitation-inhibition 
task and were given 20 practice trials. Participants performed one block of the imitation-
inhibition task under self focus and one block without self-focus. In the self-focus 
condition two mirrors were put on the left and right side of the monitor, so that 
participants could see their face and upper part of their body in the mirror. They were 
however instructed that the mirror was irrelevant for the experiment and that participants 
should focus on the experiment. After the first block, subjects received a short break of 
approximately 5 min, in which they were led outside the testing room to decrease 
possible effects of the preceding self-focus conditions. Under the no self-focus condition 
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the mirrors were turned around with the non-reflective side facing the subjects. The block 
order was fully counterbalanced across subjects. After the experiments subjects were 
fully debriefed about the aim of the experiment and were paid for their participation. 
 
Imitation-inhibition task 
In the imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2000), participants had to lift their 
index or middle finger in response to a number (1 = lift index finger, 2 = lift middle 
finger), whilst viewing simultaneously congruent or incongruent finger movements on a 
computer screen (Fig. 1A). As in congruent trials, the video-taped hand executed an 
identical finger movement to the instructed movement, the participants were not required 
to distinguish their intended action from the observed action. Their response was 
therefore a quasi-imitative reaction with regard to the observed movement, which is 
normally indicated by faster reaction times on congruent trials (Brass et al., 2000). 
Contrary, in incongruent trials the instructed movement differed from the observed 
movement, which introduces an imitative tendency to execute the observed movement. 
This necessitates subjects to enforce the intended movement against the observed action, 
reflected in longer reaction times on incongruent trials (Brass et al., 2000). The required 
response on incongruent trials reflects therefore a non-imitative reaction with regard to 
the perceived movement. The experiment consisted of incongruent trials and congruent 
trials which were presented randomly. The video sequence began with a frame showing 
the hand, which mirrored the right hand of the subject, in resting position for 650 ms. 
Two frames lasting 34 ms then showed the finger movement (congruent and incongruent 
trials). The video sequence finished with the finger in the end position (650 ms). The 
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imperative stimulus was presented with the onset of the movement. The screen remained 
blank between trials for 2 s. Responses were recorded with custom-built keypad, which 
used light sensors to detect finger lifting movements of the index and middle finger of the 
subjects’ right hand. 
 
Results and discussion 
A repeated-measurement ANOVA of the reaction time data with the factors self-
focus (mirror, no mirror) and the factor condition (incongruent, congruent) revealed a 
main effect of condition (F(1,18) = 133.7, p < 0.001), no main effect of self-focus 
(F(1.18) = 0.7, p > 0.4) and, as predicted, a significant interaction effect self-focus by 
condition (F(1,18) = 4,8, p < 0.4) (Fig. 3B), thus showing a reduced interference effect in 
the imitation-inhibition task  (Fig. 3A). Planned t-tests indicated that this interaction 
effect was rather driven by faster reaction times in incongruent trials under self-focus 
condition (t(18) = 1.5, p < 0.5, one-tailed) than reaction times on the congruent condition 
(t(18) = -0,2), p <0.4, one-tailed). A second ANOVA did not reveal a significant 
interaction for error rates (F(1,18) = 0.008, p < 0.9). 
Our first experiment revealed that a self-focus manipulation can successfully 
minimize motor mimicry. This experiment used an established method of self-focus 
enhancement, the ‘mirror manipulation’, which uses physical stimuli (perception of one’s 
own face) to induce self-related processing. Experiment 2 aimed to replicate these 
findings by using a different method of heightening self-focus, namely by using verbal 
stimuli which have to be evaluated and thus call onto processes of self-knowledge and -
valuation. The second study also used a better suited control condition than Experiment 
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1, namely a semantic memory task, to control for additional processes not related to self-
focus induction. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Participants 
Sixteen volunteers (female, mean age years, range ) participated in the 
experiment. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Experiment was undertaken with the understanding and written consent of each 
subject and in compliance with national legislation and the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Procedure 
After arrival participants received a written instruction of the imitation-inhibition 
task and the self-referential task and were informed that they had to perform both tasks in 
alternation. They were then given 20 practice trials. Participants performed one block of 
the imitation-inhibition task under self focus and one block without self-focus (Fig. 3). In 
the self-focus condition participants performed alternating trials of the self-referential 
task and the imitation-inhibition task. In the no self-focus condition a semantic memory 
task as a control condition was presented in alternation with the imitation-inhibition 
trials. After the first block, subjects received a short break of approximately 5 min, in 
which they were led outside the testing room to decrease possible effects of preceding 
self-focus conditions. The block order was fully counterbalanced across subjects. After 
the experiments subjects were fully debriefed about the aim of the experiment and were 
paid for their participation. 
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 Imitation-inhibition task 
The same task and stimuli were used as in Experiment 1. The task consisted of 30 
congruent and 30 incongruent trials which were presented randomly. The trials of the 
imitation-inhibition task were presented intermixed with the trials of the self-referential 
task. The intertask-interval was 2 s. 
 
Self-referential task 
In order to tap processes related to self-knowledge (i.e. the ability to differentiate 
self from other objects and recognize attributes and preferences of oneself (Amodio & 
Frith, 2006)), we used a replication of an evaluative task developed by Zysset and 
colleagues (2002). Evaluative judgments are a special type of judgment, in which the 
internal scale is related to the person’s value system (preferences, norms, aesthetic 
values, etc.). In contrast to memory retrieval in general, many evaluative judgments are 
self-referential in that they refer to the subjects “narrative” self (Gallagher, 2000). In the 
evaluative conditions participants had to read sentences and had to decide whether they 
agreed with this statement (e.g. “Leipzig is a pleasant town”). In order to isolate 
processes specific for self-related, evaluative judgments, we used semantic memory 
retrieval trials (e.g. “Leipzig is the capital of Germany.”) as a control condition. For each 
experimental condition 60 sentences were randomly presented. Sentences have been 
carefully controlled for an equal distribution of yes- and no-responses and for difficulty 
in the memory condition (for further information on the stimulus material see Zysset et 
al., 2002). In each trial the sentence was presented for 2 s. Subjects were given 4 s after 
 13
stimulus onset to respond by saying “yes” or “no” into a headset. We used verbal 
response to prevent interference with the motor response in the imitation-inhibition task. 
Participants were informed that their verbal responses were recorded to ensure their 
compliance with the instruction. 
 
Results and discussion 
Analysis of the reaction time data with a repeated-measurement ANOVA (factors 
self-focus (mirror, no mirror) and the factor condition (incongruent, congruent) revealed 
a main effect of condition (F(1,15) = 50, 9, p < 0.001), a main effect of self-focus 
(F(1,15) = 8.2, p < 0.01) and again a significant interaction (F(1,15) = 5,3, p < 0.035) 
(Fig. 4B) and thus again reduced interference in the self-focus block (Fig. 4A). Planned t-
tests showed that this main effect of self-condition and the interaction effect were driven 
by faster reaction times in incongruent trials under self-focus condition compared to the 
no self-focus block (t(16) = -3,1, p < 0.006). The congruent condition did not 
significantly differ between the two blocks (self-focus, no self-focus) (t(15) = -1,9, p < 
0.07). A second ANOVA did not reveal a significant interaction for error rates (F(1,15) = 
0.5, p < 0.4).  
 By employing a different method of self-focus induction Experiment 2 thus 
corroborated the findings of Experiment 1, that self-focus leads to an enhancement of 
online action control mechanisms under motor contagion. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Our present study combined recent findings from functional neuroimaging on the control 
of motor mimicry (Spengler et al., 2009; Brass et al., 2009) and well-established evidence 
from social psychology on self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) to derive our 
current hypotheses. In particular, it was predicted that heightened self-focus should lead 
to an enhancement of action control mechanisms needed during motor contagion. Our 
findings from a within-subject design confirmed this idea by showing that the 
interference effect in the imitation-inhibition task was diminished under self-focus, 
driven especially through increased performance in trials with a conflict between own 
and observed action intention. Crucially, we were able to replicate these results in two 
experiments, which differed in the method of self-focus induction, ruling out alternative 
explanations due to a specific implementation of self-focus enhancement. Experiment 1 
used the commonly used ‘mirror-manipulation’ to enhance self-focus by means of visual 
presentation of one’s own face, while Experiment 2 demonstrated that also abstract 
evaluative judgments call on self-reflective processes. This is in line with previous 
findings from functional neuroimaging, which have shown that a whole range of self-
related stimuli across all functional domains- physical and psychological stimuli (e.g. 
facial and bodily information or emotional, mnemonic, verbal and conceptual stimuli) 
(Northoff et al., 2006)- can activate cortical midline structures, particularly the mPFC, 
which is dedicated to the processing of self-related information (Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
For example, mPFC has been recruited by seeing one’s own face (Kircher et al.,, 2001; 
Platek et al., 2003, 2004), or hearing one’s own name (Kampe et al., 2003), as well as by 
conceptual processing of self-knowledge, such as reflecting on our own personal 
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characteristics (e.g. Zysset et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002). Consistently, our findings 
show that different self-related information can elicit self directed processing, but, more 
importantly, that self-focus can elicit functional mechanisms, which are pivotal for the 
enhancement of own intentions under motor contagion.  
One intriguing, but still speculative, question is which functional mechanisms 
exactly mediate the influence of self-focus on the amount of overt motor mimicry, or on 
‘mirroring’ responses, which show a close match between perceived stimulus and motor 
response, in general. Ideomotor theory proposes that the translation from visual stimuli to 
a corresponding motor representation in the observer occurs because actions are 
represented in the form of the sensory feedback they produce (Brass & Heyes, 2005) 
(Fig. 5). Thus, both intended and perceived movements subsequently activate the 
matching motor representation. Although this model at a first glance implies that the 
visuomotor translation operates automatically and thus produces an invariant motor 
output, several moderating factors may have an influence on the resulting behaviour. 
Heyes and Bird (2008) suggested that changes in exhibiting mirroring behavior 
could be due to several moderating factors. First, it may be influenced through input 
factors, variables, which affect stimulus processing, such as attention to the perceived 
stimulus or stimulus salience; second, sensorimotor experience and the individual’s 
history of learning affecting the translation from sensory to motor representations, and 
third, output factors, including top-down processes, such as task instructions, intentions 
or knowledge. These output factors would influence whether the activation of a motor 
representation is inhibited or expressed in overt behavior (right side, Fig. 5). Ideomotor 
theory assumes that actions become bound to their sensory consequences through 
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associative learning and, as we did not modulate such learning in the present study, the 
influence of sensorimotor experience may be in this case disregarded. Concerning input 
factors, these moderators might influence the processing of the input stimuli by 
increasing or decreasing attention towards the observed body movements. In turn, this 
would also affect the amount of motor mimicry exhibited by the participants through 
more or less activation of the corresponding sensory and motor representation. It might 
be argued that in Experiment 1, attention towards the movement stimulus was diminished 
during the mirror manipulation and thereby caused the decrease of the inference effect in 
the self-focus condition. This would be expected if the perception of one’s own mirror 
image distracts the attention of the participants from the monitor. Such a distractor effect 
should result in general slower reaction times in the self-focus block, as the time to 
identify the imperative stimulus would also be prolonged. However, we did not find any 
main effect of self-focus on reaction times in Experiment 1, and, if at all, general RTs in 
the self-focus condition were faster compared to the control condition in Experiment 2. 
Furthermore, if it was the case that self-focus lowers the processing of body movements 
by focusing attention onto the imperative stimulus then congruent trials, as a measure of 
the facilitation induced by the perception of the to-be-executed movement, should have 
slower reaction times under the self-focus compared to the no self-focus condition. But 
such an effect could not be found in both experiments, as the reaction times in the 
congruent condition were either similar or rather faster in the self-block. In line with the 
findings of Leighton et al. (2009), where likewise no evidence was found for an 
attentional modulation on motor mimicry effects, these results argue against the impact of 
input factors on the current diminished interference effects under self-focus. Therefore, 
 17
output factors, comprising ‘top-down’ processing, seem to be the most likely candidate 
for the observed modulation of motor mimicry effects. Top-down control, with the 
prefrontal cortex as the most likely source of these signals, is related to long-term 
cognitive strategies and goals, and can temporarily enhance or decrease processing of 
related information (Miller & D’Esposito, 2005). This is consistent with our initial 
hypothesis that self-related processing in mPFC may modulate motor mimicry responses 
in motor cortices. More specifically, there may be two possible ways how increased self-
focus may influence the motor representation stage - through an activating or an 
inhibitory route (left side in Fig. 5). Our model proposes that heightened self-awareness 
may enhance the intention coding the desired movement, and in turn, then either activate 
the motor representation of this movement (green line, this would in fact be mediated by 
a prior enhancement of the corresponding sensory representation), or by inhibiting the 
motor representation corresponding to the perceived, opposite movement (red line). 
Although there is so far no firm evidence, which would speak clearly for one of those two 
alternatives, preliminary findings would rather support the inhibitory route. Two recent 
neuroimaging studies suggest that the mPFC, hosting the proposed top-down influences 
of self-focus, was negatively correlated with areas implicated in mirroring either 
emotional or motor input, when this input was undesired for the task at hand (Cheng et 
al., 2007; Spengler et al., 2009). Additionally, it may be possible that self-related 
processing in mPFC might modulate the motor representation level, even when no own 
intentions exist, a hypothesis which has not been explicitly tested so far, although it was 
shown that during pure action observation, self-attribution of actions diminished the 
excitability of the primary motor cortex (Schuetz-Bosbach et al., 2004).  
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Additionally, it may be possible that the effect of heightened self-focus on motor mimicry 
is mediated by the evocation of emotions. It has been shown that increased self-
awareness leads to negative affect, through the realization of the discrepancy between the 
current and desired state, regarding for example one’s goals or norms  (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972), especially in depressive populations (). Moreover, it has been shown 
that also negative affect enhances self-focus (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Wood, Saltzberg, & 
Goldsamt, 1990). Furthermore, theories on emotional processing have suggested that 
negative emotions, for example, the experience of sadness either in oneself or through the 
perception of conspecifics, leads to a general inhibition of behaviour, which may serve an 
adaptive survival function to possibly avoid the occurrence of similar negative events 
(Killagoe et al., 2004; Potts et al., 1989). Thus, negative emotions may lead in general to 
an inhibition of the motor representation stage, suppressing automatically activated motor 
responses, to prevent further behavior evoking negative outcomes and emotions. In 
contrast, positive affect may be related to increased unintentional motor mimicry of 
observed behavior to increase the likelihood of positive and rewarding consequences. 
Interestingly, the reverse effect has been shown, namely that being imitated by someone 
else leds to positive mood and the activation reward-related circuits (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999, Kuehn et al., subm.). 
In summary, our findings have relevance to theories conceptualizing possible 
influence factors on motor contagion processes and on online action control mechanisms 
to reduce automatic imitation effects. Here, we show that, possibly top-down mediated, 
moderating factors can alter mirroring responses during motor contagion. Showing that a 
modulation of motor mimicry is possible by imposing self-focus conditions may also be 
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of importance in changing automatic motor mimicry effects in natural settings and 
everyday situations. This may have implications for changing undesired or detrimental 
effects of automatic imitative behaviour, such as heightened aggressive behaviour after 
expose to community or media violence (Guerra at al., 2002,; Huesmann et al., 1983) or 
increased imitation of alcohol consumption in social situations (Larsen et al., 2009). 
Enhanced focus on one’s own goals and intentions and a belief in one’s own capacity to 
freely choose actions (Baumeister et al., 2009) might help counteract predominant 
imitation-driven behavior. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1. A) During the imitation-inhibition task participants have to respond to a 
number on the monitor (1 or 2) by lifting their index- or middle finger. Concurrently, 
either the same movement (congruent condition) or the opposite movement is presented 
(incongruent condition). Displayed are two example stimuli for both conditions and the 
required response of the participant. B) Meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies 
(taken from Brass, Ruby & Spengler, 2009). The imitation-inhibition task (red dot) 
activates a similar region in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), as self-referential 
(green) and mentalizing tasks (blue points). 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1: A) Mean interference effect for reaction times (incongruent 
minus congruent trials) and standard error of the mean for the self-focus and no self-focus 
block. B) Reaction times for in the incongruent and congruent condition with and without 
self-focus. 
 
Figure 3. Example of a trial sequence of the self-focus and no self-focus block in 
experiment 2. 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 2: A) Mean interference effect for reaction times (incongruent 
minus congruent trials) and standard error of the mean for the self-focus and no self-focus 
block. B) Reaction times for in the incongruent (continuous line) and congruent condition 
(dotted line) with and without self-focus. 
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 Figure 5.  A schematic model of ideomotor action control and possible moderating 
factors, see text for explanation. 
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